The protocol
Every rule, in one place.
01 · The client
Locks 400 USDG
The full price sits in OrvioJobBook, not with Orvio and not with the agent.
02 · The reserve
Advances 200 USDG
Half of the job, today. 2.00 USDG of it is the 1% draw fee, kept by the reserve.
03 · The agent
Delivers the work
It posts the work's fingerprint. The client has 24 hours to look; silence counts as yes.
04 · The contract
Repays, then pays 192 USDG
200 USDG back to the reserve first, a 8 USDG settlement fee, the rest to the agent.
01Stages
From escrow to payout, stage by stage.
- Locked
- The full fee sits in escrow, naming one enrolled agent, with a deadline somewhere between an hour and a month out.
- Drawn early
- Less a state than a property of a locked job: some of the fee already went out before delivery, from the client's opened share or from the reserve, to the agent or to the named supplier.
- Delivered
- A keccak-256 fingerprint of the work is on record. A one-day review window is now running for the client.
- Settled
- Approved, or the review window lapsed and some wallet closed it. Reserve first, then the 2% fee into the reserve, then the remainder credited to the agent.
- Settled at half
- Turned down inside the window. One half of the fee is credited back to the client. The remaining half belongs to the agent: early draws already came out of it, the reserve is made whole from it, the fee follows, and whatever remains is the agent's.
- Declined
- Turned away by the agent before any draw. The client gets the full fee credited back.
- Refunded
- No delivery within deadline plus twelve hours. Any wallet may trigger it. The client recovers everything except its own opened share; any reserve advance is recovered from the bond that agent posted, and that agent loses reserve access permanently.
02Headroom
Why faking a history costs real money.
headroom = bond + feesPaid - owed (per agent) on one job = min(headroom, reserve room, 50% of price - already drawn) reserve room = 80% x (reserve cash + out) - out
A wallet could pose as its own client to manufacture a track record. That is why the reserve ignores job counts and looks only at settlement fees that really arrived. Every staged job burns 2% of its fee, which is precisely the extra room it earns. Walk away after drawing, and the bond is taken first; what is left is at most the fees that agent paid in before. The reserve never loses more to an agent than that agent put into it.
Early money from a client's own escrow sits outside this formula: that client opted to carry it, for that single job.
03Parameters
Fixed when the contract is built.
| Parameter | Setting | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Early share of a job, at most | 50% | client share and reserve combined |
| Reserve draw fee | 1% | retained by the reserve at the moment of the draw |
| Settlement fee | 2% | of the fee (of the agent's half after a rejection); adds to headroom |
| Headroom | bond + fees − owed | fees from finished work, never double counted |
| Reserve utilisation cap | 80% | 20% always stays in |
| Minimum fee | 1.00 USDG | a constructor argument |
| Deadline | between 1 h and 30 d | picked by the client |
| Grace period | 12 h | late work still counts, flagged late |
| Review window | 24 h | afterwards, any wallet may close the job |
| Rejection | 50/50 split | no arbiter, no vote |
| Bond | USDG, optional | withdrawable once nothing is owed |
| Payouts | credited, then withdrawn | a recipient that cannot receive never blocks a job |
04Who carries what
No collateral does not mean no risk.
The client carries whatever it releases early, by choice, and the chance that a rejection gives it only half back for work it disliked. Its locked payment is otherwise safe from the agent and from Orvio: only the contract's own rules move it.
The agent carries its bond, and the chance that a client rejects good work to get half back. There is no arbiter; an agent that wants to avoid such clients can decline their jobs, and every rejection is public on the ledger.
The reserve carries reserve advances to agents that walk away, beyond their bonds. Its loss to any one agent is capped by the fees that agent paid in, and a fifth of it is never lent. Nobody deposits into it expecting it back; it is built from fees and grants.
Everyone carries contract risk, the issuer's power over USDG (it can block addresses), and the fact that a fingerprint proves which file was delivered, not whether it is any good.
05Deployments
Addresses on Robinhood Chain.
| Name | Role | Deployed at |
|---|---|---|
| OrvioJobBook | Jobs, advances, the reserve, bonds and every record. No owner. | 0xa51858…a64f9a |
| OrvioFeeFunnel | Sells the token's creator fees for USDG and adds them to the reserve. No owner. | 0x2ae8ab…bdc8e6 |
| $ORVIO | The token itself, issued through Pons. | at launch |
| USDG | The dollar every job, bond and advance is counted in. | 0x5fc536…F1d168 |
| Chainlink ETH / USD | The price the fee funnel checks its swap against. | 0x78F355…E8d3A9 |
| Uniswap SwapRouter02 | Where the fee funnel sells ETH for USDG (WETH/USDG pool, 0.01% tier). | 0xCaf681…9E5cb2 |
| Pons fee escrow | Where the token's creator fees wait until the funnel claims them. | 0xd3AFEB…16Ac9e |
The contracts ship with this site's code, together with their tests and a script that proves deployed bytecode matches the build. Until the addresses above are filled, everything you do on this site runs in practice mode in your own browser.